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Influence of the War on Balance-sheets*
By Robert H. Montgomery
Most balance-sheets of recent date differ radically from those
published prior to the commencement of the world war. Changes
worthy of comment appear not only in the surplus account but
particularly in such items as plant, inventories and reserves.
Many of the dubious items on the asset side, such as deferred
charges and capitalized expenditures of doubtful permanent value,
have disappeared. Will this desirable state of affairs continue?
The noticeable change in balance-sheets due to war conditions
commenced in 1916. At the end of 1914 depression was quite
general, values were down, federal tax rates were low and there
was little inclination on the part of business men to make any
changes in their balance-sheets other than those which had period
ically been made during prior years.
At the end of the year 1915 no substantial change had taken
place. There had, however, been some recovery in business and
large orders were being placed for war purchases, chiefly emanat
ing from foreign governments. Federal tax rates continued low.
Throughout 1916 business continued to improve and with the
enactment of the federal revenue law of September 8, 1916, effec
tive as of January 1, 1916, which carried with it increased federal
taxes, business men commenced to scrutinize their balance-sheets
with an interest which had no precedent and was unique in thor
oughness.
On March 3, 1917, the first federal excess profits tax law was
passed. Consequently from the beginning of the year 1917 the
majority of business men have constantly had in mind the effect
* An address delivered at the annual convention of the New York State Bankers’
Association at Albany, New York, June 12, 1919.
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of federal taxes on profits. As almost every item of a balancesheet affects directly or indirectly the computation of taxes, it is
obvious that the greatest single influence which has ever been felt
on balance-sheets is the federal excess or war profits tax.
Generally speaking, balance-sheets are accurate when tax rates
are high and profits are substantial. It cannot be said that the
average balance-sheet is accurate when tax rates are low or when
tax rates are high and profits are not substantial. I am referring
now to the balance-sheet as it is made up without supervision or
certification from an outside source. The tendency to fool one’s
self has been so strong and so general that the ordinary balancesheet in the pre-war period, when subjected to investigation by a
disinterested third person, required drastic treatment.
Except in the comparatively few cases where special reasons
existed for understating values or understating profits, most
business men were unwilling to provide sufficient depreciation;
they were unwilling to cut down inventory values; and they were
reluctant to provide sufficient reserves against accounts receivable.
They insisted on carrying “souvenirs” as perfectly good assets,
and they borrowed large sums of money on the strength of such
souvenirs. This tendency was so general that most bankers in
scrutinizing balance-sheets mentally calculated additional reserves
against the assets mentioned. The result was that the conserva
tive business man who had provided sufficient reserves suffered
the penalty of having, in effect, his actual quick assets reduced
because the non-conservative man had neglected to provide suffi
cient reserves.
The attitude of the treasury department in the matter of
federal taxation during the years 1909 to 1917 was not helpful
from the point of view of conservative balance-sheets. The agents
of the department were constantly disallowing depreciation and
amortization charges; allowances for obsolescence were stricken
out, and, in general, business men were encouraged to carry their
assets on their books at inflated values.
Bankers’ insistence upon accurate balance-sheets, supplemented
by the action of another governmental agency, viz., the federal
reserve board, offset the influence of the treasury department and
worked for a constantly increasing improvement in the trust
worthiness of balance-sheets. Progress, however, was fairly slow
until in the year 1917, with its enormous federal taxes, there was
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brought about what might be called a revolution in balance-sheets.
For many years bankers and accountants had spent a vast amount
of time in analyzing balance-sheets. Item after item on the assets
side was dissected and inquiries were made as to the actual worth
of book figures. The liability side was given less attention, but
there was the constant fear that all liabilities were not shown.
At the end of the year 1917, without the intervention of
bankers or accountants, great numbers of balance-sheets under
went tremendous changes. The assets side was scrutinized by the
boss himself before the books were closed and, if there was the
slightest indication of overvaluation, ruthless cuts were made in
the book figures. Plant accounts were written down to the lowest
possible point by liberal depreciation charges and by reductions in
amortization or obsolescence. Inventories of raw materials and
finished products were reduced to a cash basis. The most liberal
reserves were provided for possible losses in accounts receivable.
All possible liabilities were set up in the books. This same policy
was continued throughout 1918, so that the average balance-sheet
of the most recent date obtainable, speaking from the point of
view of a lender of money or from that of a public accountant, is
a joy to behold. I refer, of course, to those cases in which there
were profits in 1917 and 1918 subject to the higher rates of federal
taxes. Where there were no such profits the procedure outlined
was not followed, nor could it be expected that it would be
followed.
As most business enterprises were successful during 1917 and
1918, or both, the pruning process was almost general. In my
comments, therefore, I will confine myself to what I might call
those balance-sheets which underwent the heroic treatment men
tioned. While the pruning of balance-sheet operations was drastic,
yet it is a fact which must not be ignored that the inventory figures
which remain after all deductions and reserves have been taken
into account are far above pre-war values and that, if pre-war
prices were to prevail again within the near future, it is question
able whether our apparently favorable balance-sheets would be
able to stand the cuts which the application of pre-war prices
would require. I think, however, that the chances of ever getting
back to pre-war prices are too remote to justify any preparation
therefor. The purchasing price of a dollar today is so much less
than it was a few years ago that it would require a violent
3
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upheaval, not now in sight, even to approach former conditions.
We have a tremendous inflation in our own currency with a far
greater inflation in the currency of other countries. It is impossi
ble that the return to conditions of non-inflation should be rapid.
Labor costs, which are the highest factor in many industries, are
going down slowly, if at all. In many industries where wages
should be reduced, pressure against reduction is hard to over
come. This pressure comes not only from labor and the repre
sentatives of labor, but from many other sources.
A lender of money cannot ignore the radical tendencies not
only of labor reformers but of parlor socialists as well. The
latter are far more numerous than many realize. They are found
as mayors of our largest cities, in the pulpit and among borrowers
of money. We find bankers and lawyers who have made large
fortunes, which are safely invested, among our leading reformers
and informers. As General Wood recently said, “Strange doc
trines are preached in high places.” It is curious how many
wealthy people, who become inoculated with the germ which
sanctions the reduction of the fruits of labor of others, tenaciously
retain their own wealth. It is too bad that certain rich men do
not borrow money. I would like to be the banker to whom they
applied for loans.
Balance-sheets are affected by sentiment and by many in
tangible elements. Strikes, bombs and threats may turn a good
balance-sheet into an unsatisfactory one.
It is of great importance that the adjusted balance-sheet of
the present day be continued. Over long periods of years and in
many thousands of concerns it has been demonstrated that the
capitalization of such items as advertising, etc., has been a mistake.
It has been found that very liberal depreciation, writing down of
inventories, etc., has led to business success. The tendency of the
treasury department to disallow such items should be criticised.
I will admit that what is known as correct accounting may lead to
overcapitalization and inflated profits. In deciding whether an
expenditure should be capitalized or charged as an expense it is
better to be conservative than accurate.
If bankers will in future years require balance-sheets to be
made up on the same basis as the average balance-sheet at the end
of 1918, losses due to bad loans will diminish. I insist, however,
that much that was commendable in the house-cleaning as applied
4
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to balance-sheets was due to high taxation rather than to a change
in sentiment. But when the devil was not sick he was not a
monk.
When tax rates go down (if they ever do) or if profits
decline (which they will) the recent liberal and conservative
methods may not continue. For the sake of the borrower himself,
bankers should insist on a continuance of the methods of the last
few years. If there is a gradual decline in prices, it can be taken
care of without any difficulty. Wherever there is a drastic
decline in prices, it should be immediately applied to the balancesheet, no matter who is hurt.
In the great majority of cases balance-sheets are still far
from being a true picture of financial conditions. There should
be some basis of comparison between concerns in the same indus
try, buying the same raw materials and producing the same
articles. As a member of the price fixing committee in Washing
ton, I was amazed at the tremendous differences which existed in
this respect. Even when costs of production were somewhat
similar, balance-sheet valuations were widely apart. This applied
not only to a few industries, but to most industries. We were
told by the leaders of various industries that a certain amount of
capitalization could be counted upon in relation to a given unit of
production or capacity. But few concerns reflected any such
uniform or standardized figures on their balance-sheets. If price
fixing had continued for any great period of time, it is altogether
likely that there would have been a radical revision of balancesheet valuations.
I refer only to valuations of fixed assets, such as plant, machin
ery, etc. This would have been influenced by the fact that we
were endeavoring to fix uniform prices which would yield a satis
factory profit or return on investment to the average concern in a
given line of business. We could not legislate for the high cost
concern nor the weak sister. And we were willing that the low
cost, efficient producer should realize a higher return on his capital
than the high cost inefficient producer.
One of the great difficulties in price fixing was the fact that
concerns in the same industry rarely built their plants at the same
time. Some built when materials and labor costs were low.
Others built when costs were high. Some wrote their plants down
to $1.00. Others did not even charge off ordinary depreciation.
5
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It is easy to imagine the difficulties confronting those of us who
were attempting to give to our most important industries a fair
return on their investment. Here is a factor of considerable
importance. The plant which was built at war prices (which
still continue) is at a disadvantage as compared with a plant built
at pre-war prices and over-depreciated as well.
The attention of the lender of money is not always directed
to the basis of plant valuations. Theoretically money is not lent
on fixed assets. This theory, however, contains a great fallacy,
because it would be far better business to lend money to a con
cern which had a plant of good earning capacity, even though its
liabilities were 100 per cent, of its quick assets, than to a concern
whose liabilities apparently only amounted to 50 per cent, of its
quick assets, which had a poor plant and was not making good
money. There is a direct connection between plant assets and
valuations and the profit and loss account to which bankers do not
always give enough consideration.
There has been some tendency to treat accrued federal taxes
as a reserve or as a possible liability, rather than as an actual debt
to be paid in cash on fixed dates. In many cases the amount
payable is a rough guess. In some cases the amount is entirely
omitted from the balance-sheet. Considerable pressure has been
exerted upon public accountants to omit the amount payable
and merely mention the fact of the omission. The point is not
even debatable. If a profit has been earned a considerable part
of it must be set aside for federal taxes. In the state of New
York the amount payable under the new law is not inconsiderable.
It is not difficult to ascertain the amount due. No balance-sheet
should be accepted by a banker unless the tax liability is set up,
and if there is any doubt about the amount the estimate should be
ample.
Some bad advice has been given in regard to taxes. I know
of balance-sheets in cases in which the taxes which will have to
be paid will be ten times the amounts shown on the balancesheets. The amounts shown are those which uninformed persons
think can be put over the treasury department. There will be
sad awakenings in many, many cases. If I were a banker I would
insist on some verification of the item of tax liability.
I do not like the term balance-sheet. The term itself is illchosen and I am sure that it at least is partly responsible for the
6
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curse of balancing. The trouble with most balance-sheets is that
they balance. I have no possible objection to a bookkeeper’s
being able to balance his books. In fact I would not employ a
bookkeeper who did not understand the gentle art of balancing,
just as I insist that my thirteen-year-old boy must study Latin
and algebra. Balancing and Latin are forgivable as elements of a
liberal education, but they should not be made offensive. Instead
of a balance-sheet (which always balances) bankers should call
for a statement of assets and liabilities and if it balances it should
be returned for correction. Very frequently balance-sheets upon
which large amounts of money are lent are exactly what the name
implies, that is, certain figures are extracted from the debit and
credit sides of ledgers and in turn are transferred to sheets of
paper without any intelligent thought being given to the relation
ship of the figures to the things which the figures are supposed to
represent. Even if a bookkeeper should at the time of trans
ferring the figures realize that some of his figures did not at all
represent the things themselves, what I call the curse of balancing
would prevent a correction. He would be afraid to make the
correction because if he did so the balance-sheet would not bal
ance. The ideal balance-sheet is one which does not balance
because in such case no one fears to decrease an asset if it is over
valued or hesitates to increase a liability item or insert an addi
tional liability if it is found that all are not on the books.
Balancing has so overawed bankers and business men that
many of them would as soon remove an ancient land-mark or
make light of sacred things as strike out one figure on a balancesheet and insert another. The chief use of a statement which
balances is the smug satisfaction it affords to the bookkeeper. It
does not signify accurate or trustworthy accounts. Many of the
flagrantly false accounts which I have seen were in perfect bal
ance and so far as looks were concerned could not have been
improved. I can’t emphasize too strongly the importance of
getting at the substance of a balance-sheet and subordinating its
form. I do not belittle the importance of having a balance-sheet
in proper form. I have spent many weary hours in recasting
balance-sheets so that they could be readily understood. In my
opinion the simplest and best form is that which shows quick
assets first, grouped according to convertibility and availability,
with the totals shown, then followed by fixed and other assets in
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the order of their convertibility. On the liability side I would
show the liabilities in the same order, that is in the order in which
they must be paid. I would place bond or long term debts next,
and last of all I would show the net worth carried out in one
aggregate. Some balance-sheets which show capital stock as the
first item of liability and surplus as the last item of liability are
not only misleading (because capital stock and surplus are not
liabilities) but they require mental gymnastics in order to get at
the actual net worth of the concern.
If the borrower has not put his own house in order, there
has never been a better chance for the banker to do strong arm
work on balance-sheets than at the present time. They should
be made to reflect actual conditions and conservative values and
there should be enough uniformity about the balance-sheets of a
given industry to make comparisons possible and profitable.
Every bank which lends money should classify its balance-sheets
and not consider that each one should be expected to tell its own
story. Management is just as important as capital and a balancesheet can and should reflect management. The war balance-sheet
may show large net worth but it does not necessarily reflect good
management, because large profits were made by the majority of
concerns. Anyone could make money in most industries during
war times because the demand exceeded the supply. The profits
so made have been used to clean up balance-sheets. The impor
tant thing now is to prevent balance-sheets from getting into their
former condition. As heretofore stated the only concerns which
really cleaned house were those which were profitable from 1916
to 1918. As the tax problem was the incentive to clean house,
those concerns which were not subject to high rates of taxation
should have their balance-sheets more carefully scrutinized than
those in the more fortunate class.
The pressure on a borrower to furnish a good statement comes
not only from his own needs, but frequently from note-brokers
and bankers. High tax rates, growing out of war conditions,
have inclined many concerns to make up statements which can
safely be trusted. Obviously, such statements are the safest
ones on which to lend money. The same acid tests should be
applied to all balance-sheets, and then it will be found that the
influence of the war upon balance-sheets has been helpful alike to
the borrower and to the lender.
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